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Abstract 
Racial prejudice against Indigenous Australians contributes to their substantial 
marginalisation and discrimination. Implicit associations of Indigenous persons with 
negative connotations can unconsciously activate thoughts and behaviours that 
reinforce negative racial attitudes. Mindfulness research suggests focused attention 
on present awareness can enhance attentional control, consequently reducing 
automatic racial bias. Conversely, meaning threats violate normal expectancies, 
induce uncertainty and enhance association bias. The current study investigated 
whether mindfulness training protects against elevated implicit racial bias after an 
uncertainty threat. 112 Caucasian adults (M = 29.17, SD = 12.48) were allocated into 
one of four conditions: double active (n = 26), mindfulness active (n = 25), meaning 
threat active (n = 30), or double control (n = 31). A mindfulness exercise was 
followed by a meaning threat story with implicit racial bias measured through a 
newly constructed Indigenous Australian Race Implicit Association Test. No 
significant interaction of racial bias was revealed across conditions (p = .858, ηp2= 
0.00). The hypothesis that mindfulness training would reduce racial bias after 
meaning threat was not supported. 10-minutes of non-mindful attention may result in 
dissipated mindfulness effects due to a transient mindful state being induced for 
novice meditators.  
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Substantial negative effects from subconscious racial attitudes toward minority 
groups persist in Australian society. This thesis aims to consider the effectiveness of 
an emerging approach to reducing implicit racial bias. The reduction of racial bias in 
society will optimistically lead to better outcomes for minority groups in terms of 
equality and social justice. Despite its multicultural existence, Australia holds a 
superficial egalitarian view, with institutionalised racism infiltrating minorities’ 
environments and interactions (Sanson et al., 1998). Research investigating 
prejudiced attitudes concerning Indigenous Australians indicates the Australian 
population express racist views towards Indigenous minorities in multiple domains, 
including social interactions, education, and employment opportunities (Dunn, 
Forrest, Pe-Pua, & Smith, 2005).  
 
Dual Attitudes Model 
Prejudiced attitudes refer to the negative evaluation of a social group or 
individual, based on group categorisation (Pedersen, Walker, Paradies, & Guerin, 
2011). The dual attitudes model proposes that individuals can simultaneously hold 
opposing attitudes towards a certain object or group (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 
2000). These contrasting attitudes manifest through two distinct processing levels, 
implicit and explicit (Sturge-Apple, Rogge, Skibo, Peltz, & Suor, 2015). Implicit 
attitudes are characterised by reduced cognitive processing and a lack of conscious 
awareness (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014). Environmental cues automatically 
activate implicit attitudes, triggering well-rehearsed responses (Sturge-Apple et al., 
2015). In comparison, explicit attitudes are indicative of purposeful evaluations used 
to guide behaviour and decisions (Hahn et al., 2014). Explicit evaluations are 
controlled and adjusted to reflect socially accepted ideals (Sturge-Apple et al., 2015). 
3 
 
 
Divergence between attitudes emerges once personal experience begins to shape 
explicit attitudes (Wilson et al., 2000). For example, children’s racial beliefs are 
initially informed by their mother’s implicit attitudes (Castelli, Zogmaister, & 
Tomelleri, 2009) yet as the individual grows older, numerous factors such as peer 
influence and experience alter explicit beliefs (Wilson et al., 2000). However, as 
implicit attitudes are considered to reflect habitual evaluations covertly reinforced by 
socialised norms, overriding with explicit evaluations requires substantial cognitive 
resources (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2008). Therefore, when individuals are 
under high cognitive load and pressured to decide, decisions can reflect implicit 
attitudes based on stereotypical information (Wilson et al., 2000). The dual attitudes 
model aids understanding of why negative socialised norms persist despite strong 
explicit evaluations that reflect minor prejudiced attitudes. 
 
Racism in Australia 
The transformation of acceptable racial attitudes guides consensus that the 
adoption of egalitarian race attitudes should occur in contemporary societies 
(Stepanikova, Triplett, & Simpson, 2011). Consequently, societal pressures to 
display equality influence explicit attitudes, whereas deep-seated in-group 
preferences inform implicit evaluations (Dovidio et al., 2008). Traditionally, both 
implicit and explicit attitudes matched, with institutionalised reinforcement of ‘White 
people’ being superior to other races (Ziegert & Hanges, 2005). Research suggests 
that contemporary societies encourage egalitarian views while maintaining race 
superiority beliefs (Pedersen & Walker, 1997). Although this research is almost 
twenty years old, subsequent research has suggested the continuance of such 
attitudes in Australia (Dunn et al., 2005). Therefore, previously accepted explicit 
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prejudice has transformed to become modern racism, reflected in non-biased explicit 
racial attitudes, but underlying implicit prejudice characterised by unconscious bias 
(Dovidio et al., 2008). Exploration of racial attitudes in Australian populations 
suggests racial prejudice towards Indigenous Australians is influenced by 
stereotypical misconceptions (Pedersen, Dudgeon, Watt, & Griffiths, 2011; Pedersen, 
Griffiths, Contos, Bishop, & Walker, 2000). Dunn and colleagues (2005) found 
Indigenous Australians experience racism in employment and education institutions 
twice as often as non-Indigenous persons. Further, 43% of Indigenous Australians 
reported experiencing racial discrimination every day, with 37% reporting racial 
abuse (Dunn et al., 2005). Pedersen, Beven, Walker, and Griffiths’ (2004) findings 
revealed that lower education levels, empathetic evaluations, and collective guilt 
elevated prejudice attitudes. Using factor analysis, findings also revealed lower 
distinction between traditional and modern views of racism than seen in American 
research samples. This implies substantial marginalisation of the Indigenous 
population in Australia. Pedersen and Walker (1997) found that although traditional 
and modern forms of racism in Australia differ, a moderate correlation between the 
two forms exists. Further, Hahn and colleagues (2014) established people display 
accurate estimates of their relative bias when asked to predict their IAT performance. 
These findings suggest individuals are potentially aware of their prejudice, but are 
lacking methods to inhibit the activation of implicit biases that influences attitudes 
and behaviours (Hahn et al., 2014). Therefore, finding interventions that successfully 
align individuals’ implicit racial attitudes with their explicit egalitarian goals is core 
to reducing discrimination against Indigenous persons in Australia. 
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Implicit Racial Association Bias 
As differential processing mechanisms are accessed for implicit and explicit 
attitudes, different methodological tools are required to reliably measure these 
distinct beliefs. Measuring explicit attitudes occurs via self-report, as the individual 
is required to provide thoughtful evaluations (Hahn et al., 2014). In comparison, 
assessment of implicit attitudes aims to reveal underlying cognitive processes and 
uncontrolled evaluations (Sturge-Apple et al., 2015). As racial evaluations reflect 
implicit attitudes and unconscious processing, contemporary racial measures assess 
automatic associations through tasks that restrict response time and thoughtful 
evaluations (Sturge-Apple et al., 2015). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
measures associative strength between a target concept and a characteristic based on 
accuracy and speed (Baron & Banaji, 2006). The IAT requires pairing visual images 
of members of a social group with ‘good’ or ‘bad’ attributes under time constraints. 
Response latency indicators suggest the relative strength of racial attitudes based on 
how quickly individuals pair stereotypical concepts against non-stereotypical 
associations. Theoretically, an individual with elevated racial bias will react quickly 
to stereotypical categorisation of White with ‘good’ and slower to non-stereotypical 
categorisation of Indigenous with ‘bad’ (Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, & Christie, 
2006). This latency differentiation demonstrates individuals’ underlying racial 
attitudes through the relative strength of automatic stereotypical associations. 
 
Reducing Implicit Association Bias 
The inhibition of associated memory patterns is extremely difficult once they are 
activated (Dovidio et al., 2008), despite intention to control or limit them. An 
example is American police officers’ elevated shooter bias towards Black minorities. 
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Research indicates White participants are faster at identifying a Black target with a 
gun, require less perceptual information to shoot a Black target, and are more likely 
to label a neutral object as a gun if the target is Black (Correll, Park, Judd, & 
Wittenbrink, 2002). Due to stereotypical associations of Black persons with 
criminality, automatic racial biases pair Black people and threat, often resulting in 
fatal discriminatory action (Correll, Wittenbrink, Park, Judd, & Goyle, 2011). 
Clearly, identifying ways to reduce automaticity of responses and stereotypical 
association is important (Mekawi & Bresin, 2015).  
Fortunately, research has consistently suggested reducing the automatic 
activation of implicit racial biases is possible. Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, 
and Russin (2000) trained participants to negate stereotypical associations to 
examine whether inhibiting them would reduce automatic racial biases. Findings 
revealed a reduction in stereotypical activation that continued 24 hours after negation 
training. Kawakami, Dovidio, and Kamp (2005) extended this research through 
investigating discriminatory actions in relation to hiring decisions. Participants 
paired non-stereotypical attributes, such as strong and sensitive, with opposing 
gender categories. Overall, discriminatory decisions continued, with greater rates of 
hiring males above females. However, this effect was lower for those under high 
cognitive load. These findings suggest that although stereotypical activation may be 
minimised through learning to negate associations, this will not necessarily generate 
reduced discriminatory behaviours. Kawakami and colleagues (2005) imply that this 
training technique could threaten some individuals’ sense of control, which may 
explain the unpredicted results. The current study intends to further this line of 
research, but aims to reduce automaticity of racial associations without any 
contradiction or manipulation of current, underlying attitudes. It is hypothesised that 
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inducing a state of increased present awareness will reduce implicit racial bias 
without challenging participants’ existing attitudes.  
 
Automatic Decision Mechanisms 
Research explaining variations between implicit and explicit responses to racial 
stimuli have previously utilised the dual processing model. Schneider and Shiffrin 
(1977) proposed that the capacity for automatic and controlled processing of 
information is determined by associated memory patterns. Accordingly, automatic 
processing refers to a set of well-learnt memory nodes activated in response to 
certain stimuli (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). This mechanism does not necessarily 
require applied attention due to strong associations developed through consistent 
pairing and learnt association. The generation of stereotypical beliefs begins in early 
childhood with associations consistently reinforced throughout development 
(Gendler, 2008). Baron and Banaji’s (2006) findings revealed implicit racial attitudes 
emerge in children aged six years old. Disassociations between implicit and explicit 
attitudes occur by the age of ten and maintain throughout adulthood. This highlights 
the effect of sociocultural norms and consequential internalisation of stereotypical 
associations (Baron & Banaji, 2006). Early emergence suggests strong establishment 
of associations later in life, due to ongoing stereotypical confirmation throughout 
development.  
 
Controlled Decision Mechanisms 
Researchers assessing the malleability of automatic processing (Sherman et al., 
2008), challenge the assumption that automatic associations are inflexible and 
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uncontrollable. Historically, conceptualisations of automaticity emphasise its 
effortless and dominating nature, with activation proceeding despite contrary 
motivations and intentions (Blair, 2002). Furthermore, definitions of automaticity 
focused on elements such as lack of control, attention, and awareness. Research has 
revealed that the activation and control of automatic associations is dependent on a 
range of factors. Blair’s (2002) review indicates that through the manipulation of 
attention, gaining control of automatic stereotypical associations is possible. 
Focusing attention on a particular element of a stereotypical association ensures that 
detail is salient, consequently altering attitude activation (Blair, 2002). Mitchell, 
Nosek, and Banaji (2003) found focusing attention on specific, stereotypical 
categories reduced implicit association bias for other stereotypical categories. In their 
study, specific race or gender features were targeted. Attendance to racial features 
resulted in higher negative evaluations of Black females compared to White males. 
Yet when gender was salient, Black females were more positively evaluated 
(Mitchell et al., 2003). This suggests automatic activation of stereotypical 
associations depends on the salience of categorisation features. Focusing attention on 
information unrelated to specific stereotypical beliefs can improve response control 
(Blair, 2002). This is important as it illustrates the role of attention in automaticity 
and suggests that finding ways to enhance or reduce attention will influence the 
activation of stereotypical associations.  
Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, and Czopp (2002) proposed that in order to 
gain control over stereotypical automatic biases, individuals must learn to break 
habitual responses. Applying Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) neuropsychological 
model of motivation, Monteith and colleagues explain that self-regulation is 
triggered by discrepancies between conscious beliefs and actual responses; an 
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awareness of failure to control stereotypical responses. Motivation to reduce 
anomalies elicits cognitive resources to regain control of reactions. When this occurs, 
stimuli associated with the discrepancy are internalised and control cues are 
established. Theoretically, this ensures that in future situations where discrepant 
responses might occur and automatic associations are likely activated, control cues 
prompt regulated responses to override automatic reactions. This regulation process 
is supported by research identifying that focusing on egalitarian goals unconsciously 
inhibits stereotypical association (Moskowitz & Li, 2011). Kawakami and colleagues 
(2005) suggested threatening participants’ sense of control minimises the potential to 
reduce bias. Correspondingly, Moskowitz and Li (2011) discovered self-
identification of previous attitude discrepancies improves control mechanisms and 
enhances capacity to reduce implicit biases. These studies suggest methods that 
maximise personal control are more likely to result in attitude change and alteration 
of biased beliefs. Further implied is the malleability of automatic biases. Enhanced 
application of self-regulation through cognitive resources can activate inhibitory 
control of stereotypical associations (Monteith et al., 2002).      
  
The Role of Self-Regulation and Attention 
Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, and Groom (2005) present a 
quadruple model to support the notion that implicit associations are malleable, and 
suggest humans can control biases through focused self-regulation. They assert that 
implicit decisions are determined based on four qualitatively distinct processes: 
whether a stimulus activates an automatic association, whether correct responses are 
identifiable, the capacity to overcome automatic bias and, whether biased beliefs 
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inform guesses (Conrey et al., 2005). Quadruple model suggests that improved self-
regulation of processing occurs when necessary cognitive resources are available to 
inform each of these processes. Successful application of the four mechanisms 
creates minimal disassociation between implicit and explicit responses (Sherman et 
al., 2008). The model postulates that due to strong sociocultural influences, context 
drives regulation processes. The activation of higher levels of control processing 
occurs in scenarios where negative evaluations are probable, whereas private settings 
allow lower response control (Sherman et al., 2008). Alcohol intoxication 
exemplifies this regulation mechanism for stereotypical association (Sherman et al., 
2008). Disinhibiting effects of alcohol result in enhanced automaticity of responses 
with reduced capacity to inhibit immediate reactions and integrate important 
contextual cues (Noël, Tomberg, Verbanck, & Campanella, 2010).  
Sherman and colleagues (2008) argue the quadruple model explains impulsivity 
of responses. As self-regulation entails the integration of multiple dimensions of 
information, substantial attentional and cognitive resources are required. Superior 
regulation capabilities require the capacity to integrate environmental and 
interpersonal cues. The capacity to achieve integration is moderated by the level of 
attention available and exerted. Therefore, mechanisms that improve the allocation of 
attentional resources to required domains will allow for advanced self-regulation and 
control of responses.  
 
Expectancy-Deviation Hypothesis  
Oliveira, McDonald, and Goodman (2007) used event-related potentials (ERP) 
to establish that activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) occurs via goal 
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expectancy violations. Specifically, the error-related negativity (ERN) is an ERP 
pattern that reflects error detections. This neuronal signal acts as a performance 
monitoring system with feedback triggering reductions of dopamine levels in the 
ACC to indicate problems in task performance (Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 
2012). Oliveira and colleagues discovered that elevated ERN activation is not 
exclusive to negative reactions. Research revealed that receiving positive feedback 
while expecting negative, and error feedback when expecting success, elicits a 
similar ACC activation. This has led to the conceptualisation of the expectancy-
deviation hypothesis, which argues that when an individual receives feedback that is 
inconsistent with their expectations they have a strong ERN response resulting in 
ACC activation (Oliveira et al., 2007; Proulx et al., 2012). The implications of this 
finding reflect broader understandings of expectancy-violation literature. The 
expectancy-deviation hypothesis suggests that questioning certainty results in a 
neurological reaction that activates executive control and cognitive resources 
(Oliveria et al., 2007) to regain control and certainty (Proulx & Heine, 2009). This 
heightened aversive arousal is a subclinical anxiety state that induces substantial 
unease which humans are highly motivated to reduce (Proulx et al., 2012). 
  
Meaning Maintenance Models 
The need for humans to understand and make meaning of their world is not a 
new finding. Existentialist writings in the 19th century recognised the aversive state 
that occurred when experiences were not understandable (Proulx & Heine, 2010). 
Humans are motivated by a strong desire to maintain perceptions of personal control 
(Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009). Termed schemas, humans use 
associations between propositions to organise information (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). 
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Expectations guide effective responses to a range of experiences and these 
relationships are the basis for reactive behaviours and emotions. Expected 
relationships allow humans to feel in control of their environments with the ability to 
predict situational and social outcomes (Kay et al., 2009). Violations to meaning 
frameworks trigger psychological discomfort, motivating people to affirm meaning 
in any domain to restore certainty (Randles, Proulx, & Heine, 2010). The meaning 
maintenance model integrates all perspectives of threat-compensation literature and 
suggests that the different manifestations are all due to the core, psychological 
motivation to maintain meaning (Proulx et al., 2012).  
A common response to meaning threat is to identify and affirm known 
associations between stimuli. If restoration of the specific exposed meaning 
framework is not possible, an automatic reaction is to affirm associations in an 
unrelated structure (Heine, Proulx, & Voh, 2006). The perceived anomaly is not 
resolved but the focus of attention upon a different domain that is not threatened 
restores sense of meaning and reduces aversive state (Randles et al., 2010). 
Consequently, arousal that occurs from violated expectancies can reinforce unrelated 
beliefs. McGregor and Marigold (2003) propose that compensation responses are 
defensive mechanisms used to minimise the effect of uncertainty threat. Substantial 
research reflects the phenomena of consolidating beliefs after questioned or 
challenged attitudes (McGregor & Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & 
Spencer, 2001).  
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Fluid Compensatory Affirmation 
Ample research has found evidence for fluid compensatory processes. For 
example, Proulx, Heine, and Voh (2010) examined whether compensatory 
affirmation occurs after exposure to absurd literature and art. It was hypothesised that 
the unfamiliar would activate compensatory action and induce a strong motivation to 
seek meaning and structure. Findings revealed participants were more likely to 
affirm unrelated frameworks after reading an absurd story, compared to a meaningful 
tale. Results further established that participants exposed to absurd art reported 
higher personal need for structure. Randles, Inzlicht, Proulx, Tullet, and Heine’s 
(2015) findings revealed fluid compensatory reactions follow cognitive dissonance, 
with reported increases of; beliefs in God, punishment of norm-violators, and 
extreme support for policies. These findings indicate induced uncertainty causes a 
state that people actively attempt to diffuse through restoring meaning in any 
proximate domain. Further research suggests that fluid compensatory reactions are 
unconscious and automatic (Van Tongeren & Green, 2010), reinforcing suggestions 
of an innate reaction to uncertainty (Oliveira et al., 2007).  
Van Tongeren and Green (2010) identified affirmation of meaning frameworks 
enhances certainty while subsequently reducing desires to belong. This novel 
measurement of compensatory actions suggests that affirmations directly reinforce 
meaning with lower self-reports of meaninglessness compared to controls. Randles 
and colleagues (2010) investigated a novel meaning threat and established that both 
threats and reactions can occur without conscious awareness. Implicit exposure to 
meaningless word pairs resulted in implicit learning of pairings. This implies that 
affirmation processes are so powerful that participants can subconsciously learn 
patterns of responses that they are inadvertently exposed to. Proulx and Heine (2009) 
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similarly found implicit violations of expected associations resulted in enhanced 
motivation and accuracy of learning abstract pattern sequences.  
Each of these studies supports the notion that violations of meaning expectancies 
activate compensatory affirmations, utilised to reduce aversive arousal. Objective, 
empirical evidence for the motivating role of aversive arousal has previously been 
difficult to obtain (Proulx & Heine, 2010). However, advanced physiological and 
neurocognitive measurement tools have revealed consistent activation of arousal and 
associated brain regions in response to expectancy violations (Oliveria et al., 2007; 
Proulx et al., 2012). Taken together, empirical and neurocognitive findings suggest 
meaning threats create an automatic, aversive arousal that reduces humans’ capacity 
to make controlled decisions. Compensatory responses engage without conscious 
perception, often reverting to reactions informed by implicit biases. This 
automaticity of responding begs the question, what is the role of these affirmations in 
racial stereotypical activation?  
 
Social Affirmations 
Social categorisation relies on prototypical associations to guide behaviours and 
beliefs (Grant & Hogg, 2012). In relation to intergroup affirmations, reinforcing 
differences between an individual’s own identity groups and out-groups can facilitate 
uncertainty reduction (Kay et al., 2009). Social categorisation refers to the process of 
defining oneself and others to enable structured understanding of the social world to 
clarify meaning and predictability (Grant & Hogg, 2012). Prototypical categorisation 
describes social knowledge and allows individuals to predict behaviours and 
interactions. McGregor and colleagues (2001) identified that meaning threats 
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significantly enhanced intergroup bias, with heightened shared identity for those 
similar to oneself and magnified differentiation from others. As fluid compensatory 
affirmation magnifies attitudinal certainty for unrelated meaning frameworks, 
meaning threats result in automatic confirmation of prior beliefs (Heine et al., 2006). 
This suggests that reinforcement of racial prejudice can occur continuously, without 
the individual’s awareness. Therefore, when exposed to a meaning threat, individuals 
are likely to reinforce stereotypical racial associations if provided with such an 
outlet, regardless of intentions to remain egalitarian. Further, attitudes can influence 
discriminative behaviour without conscious awareness (Dovidio et al., 2008). 
Identifying ways to enhance regulation of these automatic reactions is crucial to 
minimise the strong stereotypical prejudice affecting Indigenous peoples in 
Australia.  
 
Mindfulness 
The practice of mindfulness meditation refers to applied self-regulation of 
attention used to recognise internal and external stimuli in a non-judgemental manner 
(Baer, 2003). Termed “the heart” of Buddhist meditation, mindfulness encourages 
refinement of attention by living in the present moment and opening the mind to 
experiences through acceptance (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Recognition of emotions, 
perceptions and cognitions without affective evaluation is the focal point of such 
practice (Baer, 2003). The goal of mindfulness interventions is not to improve one’s 
immediate position but to immerse oneself in the present moment while learning to 
examine thoughts and responses without finding solutions (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). 
Alongside awareness of experience, substantial focus on nonattachment to outcome 
is emphasised, allowing the identification and breakdown of routine maladaptive 
16 
 
 
responses (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Jha, Krompinger, and Baime (2007) identified that 
mindfulness meditation influences attentional systems differently, depending on 
previous meditation experience. Specifically, they found concentrative attention was 
heightened in the early stages of meditation, whereas a superior form of receptive 
attention was developed through ongoing practice. Concentrative attention is 
characterised by focused attention on a particular point, for example the breath, and 
any deviance or distraction from the focal point is immediately directed back. In 
comparison, receptive attention is objectless and facilitates a state of present 
readiness that allows recognition and integration of all environmental cues (Jha et al., 
2007). Stimuli considered distracters for novice meditators do not apply for receptive 
states as all experiences are incorporated into the attentional experience (Jha et al., 
2007). This suggests the capacity of mindfulness training to improve attentional 
regulation.  
 
Mindfulness Mechanisms Reducing Automaticity   
Mindfulness has been associated with the capacity for cognitive control and 
self-regulation of automatic associations (Moore & Malinowski, 2009). Baer’s 
(2003) meta-analytical review suggested that mindfulness practice has the capacity to 
alter thought patterns and attitudes. Moore and Malinowski (2009) found 
mindfulness enhances cognitive flexibility and reduces the interference of automatic 
associations on responses. Similarly, Hafenbrack, Kinias, and Barsade (2013) found 
mindfulness improves decision-making performance by reducing the influence of 
biased responses. Lueke and Gibson (2015) utilised quad analysis to examine error 
rates and patterns of response to identify that mindfulness specifically inhibits the 
activation of automatic associations.  
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The potential for mindfulness practice to reduce activation of automatic or 
uncontrollable responses instigated substantial research aiming to establish the 
underlying mechanisms. Kang, Gruber, and Gray (2013) proposed that mindfulness 
inhibits the unconscious engagement of specific behaviours through attentional 
control and cultivating awareness of the present moment. Termed de-automatization, 
individuals learn to disengage with automatic emotional and cognitive reactions and 
respond appropriately. Kang and colleagues (2013) hypothesised four components of 
mindfulness; awareness, attention, present focus, and acceptance. Each component 
contributes to de-automatization through the consequential mental processes of; 
reduced automatic inference processing, enhanced cognitive control, facilitation of 
metacognitive insight, and prevention of thought suppression and distortion (Kang et 
al., 2013). Activation of each component is necessary for the successful prompting of 
self-regulation and inhibition of habitual responses (Kang et al., 2013). This is 
relatable to Sherman and colleagues’ (2008) assessment of quadruple model and 
indicates a parallel understanding of processes underlying the influence of self-
regulation on control. Although these two mechanisms identify similar elements, 
these four aspects of mindfulness are distinct from the four parameters identified in 
quadruple model. Comparison does however reveal the shared response to 
establishing and inducing an enhanced capacity for controlled decision-making. 
 
Neurological Support of Mindfulness Mechanisms 
Moore and Malinowski’s (2009) research supports conceptualisations of reduced 
automaticity as facilitated by attentional control. They found significant correlations 
between de-automatisation and the measures of acting with awareness, and accepting 
without judgement. Functional and structural neuroimaging research also supports 
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the existence of these components. A longitudinal, randomised, control study 
assessed self-regulation of attention and changes in neuronal activity produced by 
mindfulness training (Moore, Gruber, Derose, & Malinowski, 2012). Randomisation 
to either a wait-list or a meditation group occurred for meditation inexperienced 
participants. Participants completed the Stroop Colour-Word Interference Test at 
three time points while ERP’s were recorded. Overall, findings revealed superior 
attentional processing (N2) and reduced target identification resources (P3), 
suggesting improvements to core attentional processes. ERP results indicated an 
improved capacity to inhibit attentional resources towards unrelated stimuli and 
reduced activation of cognitive resources after 16-weeks of daily mindfulness 
training. The authors propose that the generalisation of mindfulness training to a 
visual, incongruent response task reflects far transfer effects and strong training 
potential (Moore et al., 2012). Neuroimaging research proposes mindfulness 
produces enduring brain region activation and functional improvement, reflected by 
far transfer of skills into novel task settings (Slagter, Davidson, & Lutz, 2011).  
Teper and Inzlicht (2013) found that meditation enhances executive control due 
to amplification of the error-related negativity brain signal, and enhanced acceptance 
of emotional states. This suggests that meditators attain the capacity to rapidly 
identify errors and effectively accept affective states. This efficient acknowledgment 
of affect translates into superior capacity for executive functioning, as fewer 
resources are required to overcome aversive states. Improvement of the monitoring 
process allows executive functioning resources to focus on present awareness to 
identify and inhibit automatic responses (Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). This confirms 
neurological research and establishes an overall improvement of attentional capacity 
and application facilitated by mindfulness training.  
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As identified by Sherman and colleagues (2008), improved attention to 
numerous contextual details allows the inhibition of stereotypical association. 
Mindfulness improves present awareness and enhances available attentional 
resources (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Therefore, mindfulness training can facilitate 
improved awareness of discrepancies between implicit and explicit racial attitudes, 
resulting in greater likelihood of regulated and controlled responses. In comparison 
to meaning threats, mindfulness utilises additional attentional resources to maximise 
controlled decision-making processes.   
Although mindfulness does not directly achieve greater control, it allows 
individuals to become more conscious of what is and is not controllable through 
heightened awareness (Kang et al., 2013). Mindfulness practice can weaken 
stereotypical associations through inhibition of automaticity achieved by activating 
the four elements of mindfulness. Strong empirical evidence supports this claim, 
particularly in relation to racial stereotypes. Lueke and Gibson (2015) demonstrated 
that 10-minutes of mindfulness training significantly reduced the automatic 
activation of racial associations and implicit racial bias. Lueke and Gibson (2016) 
replicated measures to investigate whether reduced negative bias lead to declines in 
prejudiced behaviours. Discriminatory racial behaviour was measured by variation of 
virtual money allocations between races. Findings revealed meditators displayed 
significantly less discriminatory bias, with roughly identical allocation of money to 
both White and Black individuals (3% difference). In comparison, participants in the 
control conditions gave significantly more money (13%) to White than Black 
individuals. Elevated awareness, attention, present focus, and acceptance cultivated 
by mindfulness training (Kang et al., 2013) regulates racial stereotype activation.  
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The Current Study  
Semple (2010) conceptualised attention within a dimensional continuum, with 
ordinary attention at some point between mindless and mindful attention. 
Mindlessness refers to one extreme, distinguished by distractibility, emotional 
reactivity, unawareness, and focusing on the past or future. The other extreme is 
mindful attention, characterised by targeted focus and present moment orientation, 
with minimal reactivity and distraction (Semple, 2010). In relation to social 
categorisations and habitual responses, mindfulness disrupts immediate, automatic 
responses, or mindlessness, and promotes regulation of responses (Semple, 2010). 
Conceptualising attention following this continuum, the current study aims to 
instigate a behavioural demonstration of induced mindlessness and mindfulness to 
assess automaticity of implicit racial bias towards Indigenous Australians. 
That mindfulness training reduces maladaptive responses in both clinical and 
experimental settings is established (Lueke & Gibson, 2015; Strauss, Cavanagh, 
Oliver, & Pettman, 2014). Focusing attention on present experience without 
judgement encourages disengagement from affective evaluations, hypothetically 
reducing reliance on emotional states to activate responses. In contrast, meaning 
threat exposure enhances reliance on automatic associations due to heightened 
arousal and need to affirm certainty (Randles et al., 2010). By inducing meaning 
threat, aversive arousal in these participants is expected to create a reliance on 
automatic stereotypical associations and biases (Proulx et al., 2012), the 
mindlessness extreme of the spectrum. Preceding meaning threat induction with 
mindfulness training aims to activate controlled attention to overcome automatic 
racial bias (Lueke & Gibson, 2015). As fluid compensatory affirmations are 
commonly unconscious (Randles et al., 2010), increased awareness instigated by 
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mindfulness should allow recognition of biases and reduce the activation of 
stereotypical associations. Identifying that mindfulness can reduce automatic racial 
associations despite elevated threat-arousal is incredibly important for discriminatory 
actions and biases. Mere exposure to an out-group member can activate automatic 
stereotypical associations (Zebrowitz, White, & Wieneke, 2008). Interracial 
interactions result in threatening meaning frameworks due to expectations of how 
people should dress, speak and look. When this is different to oneself, humans feel 
uncertain and consequently affirm implicit beliefs. This exposure effect is reinforced 
by research indicating prolonged interracial exposure reduces implicit racial bias 
(Kawakami, Phills, Dovidio, & Steele, 2007). Extended interracial contact allows 
threatening stimuli to become familiar consequently reducing the need for meaning 
affirmations to diminish threat. Exposure that outlasts any potential meaning threat 
reduces the immediacy of such threat and minimises affirmation of stereotypical 
attitudes. 
 
Aims and Hypotheses  
Inducing mindfulness before meaning threat exposure will facilitate strong and 
practical evidence for learning to control automatic biases. As meaning threats often 
occur without conscious awareness (Van Tongeren & Green, 2010), people 
potentially activate racial biases simply by encountering someone of a different race. 
The current study aims to identify the protective effect of mindfulness after an 
uncertain experience. This element of resilience will aid understandings and establish 
a more realistic interpretation of mindfulness’ potential. An additional aim of the 
current study is to create and validate an Indigenous Australian Race IAT for use in 
Australian populations. An existing measure of an Indigenous Australian Race IAT 
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is available through Project Implicit (Nosek et al., 2007). However, the images lack 
satisfactory consistency and validity. The images are inappropriate to establish 
relative stereotypical strength as the presentation features vary considerably in 
comparison to the White images. Three hypotheses intend to establish the resilience 
of mindfulness after meaning threat. It was hypothesised that: 
H1. Participants in the mindfulness active and meaning threat control conditions 
would produce the lowest implicit racial bias, as measured by the mean Race IAT D 
score. 
H2. Participants in the meaning threat active and mindfulness control conditions 
would produce the highest implicit racial bias, as measured by the mean Race IAT D 
score. 
H3. Participants in the double active condition would produce lower implicit racial 
bias, as measured by the mean Race IAT D score, compared to participants in 
mindfulness control conditions.  
 
 
Method 
Participants  
The present study obtained a convenience sample of 136 participants (44 men 
and 92 women), aged between 18 and 65 (M = 29.61, SD = 12.66). Participants were 
recruited from the University of Tasmania (Launceston, Hobart, and Burnie 
campuses) and the wider community through advertising and snowballing 
techniques. Students enrolled in first year psychology units received 45 minutes of 
research participation towards their course credit. Age, race and other relevant 
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demographics were collected at the commencement of the study. Those racially 
identifying as other than Caucasian/European were not excluded from participation 
however, their data was not used in further analysis. The rationale for this exclusion 
criterion is that the Race IAT is designed specifically for administration within 
majority populations to assess implicit racial attitudes towards minority members 
(Blanton et al., 2009). The IAT uses reaction time to assess racial bias, therefore the 
upper age limit of 65 and beta-blocker medication exclusions were included to 
minimise confounding factors, due to significantly slower reaction times for these 
populations (Harrington, Saxby, McKeith, Wesnes, & Ford, 2000). The initial dataset 
of 136 was reduced to 112 (68% female) for data analysis after race, medication, and 
computer malfunctioning exclusions were applied. Data sets retained in the analysis 
included 25 participants in the mindfulness active, 26 in the double active, 30 in the 
meaning threat active, and 31 in the double control condition. 
 
Design 
The present study employed a 2 (mindfulness: active, control) x 2 (meaning 
threat: active, control) between-subjects factorial design. Automatic stereotypical 
associations identified by the Race IAT were collected as the dependent variable. 
Covariate measures of mindfulness history and anxiety reactivity were also collected.   
 
Materials and Procedure 
Ethics approval was sought from the University of Tasmania Human Research 
Ethics Committee and was confirmed on the 20th of June, 2016 (Appendix A). 
Advertisements for participation were displayed around University of Tasmania 
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campuses and circulated online forums via Facebook. Interested persons were 
directed to contact the project authors via email. Potential participants were then sent 
information regarding how to conduct themselves throughout the study, including 
required materials and what would be expected during participation. The research 
email included a hyperlink to allow research completion. Allocation of a de-
identified participant number protected data anonymity. An information sheet was 
provided and informed consent was electronically obtained before the collection of 
data commenced (Appendix B). Participants were randomly allocated to one of the 
four conditions before undertaking the baseline mindfulness and anxiety measures. In 
order to determine no pre-existing differences existed between the four groups, 
administration of the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 
2003) and State Trait Anxiety Inventory FORM-Y2 (STAI-Trait; Spielberger, 
Gorusch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) occurred. The MAAS assesses trait 
mindfulness through a 15-item self-report questionnaire requiring participants to 
respond to how frequently they experience each item based on a Likert scale, ranging 
from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never). Summation and averaging of scores 
provides each participant with a mindfulness index, with higher scores indicating 
greater levels of trait mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
The MAAS is the most widely cited measure of mindfulness, supported by 
converging evidence suggesting strong psychometric properties including test-retest 
reliability and convergent validity (Medvedev et al., 2016). Cronbach’s alpha 
indicates good internal consistency, α = 0.89, with no significant differences across 
sex, and suggesting overall strong psychometric validity (MacKillop & Anderson, 
2007). Psychometrics for the STAI-Trait reflect strong internal consistency for both 
clinical and nonclinical populations (α = 0.88 and α = 0.79, respectively) (Stanley, 
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Beck, & Zebb, 1996). Strong test re-test reliability (r = 0.84) and convergent validity 
properties further validate the STAI-Trait as an appropriate measure of trait anxiety 
(Stanley et al., 1996).  
The STAI-Trait is a self-report measure that consists of 20-items describing 
how people commonly feel. Responses require ratings on a 4-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). Summation of scores provides a 
trait anxiety index with higher scores indicating greater levels of trait anxiety 
(Spielberger et al., 1983).  
 
Manipulations 
All measures, manipulations, randomisation of tests, and data collection were 
managed via Inquisit by Millisecond software (version 5.0.4). Instructions were 
provided at the beginning and throughout each stage of the project. Four 10-minute 
audio recordings were utilised for the mindfulness, meaning threat and control 
groups (see appendix C for transcripts). Mindfulness active and control audio 
recordings were identical to those employed by Lueke and Gibson (2015) but were 
re-recorded to match voice with the meaning threat conditions. The mindfulness 
recording instructed participants to direct their attention and awareness to all bodily 
sensations, allowing any thoughts or sensations to arise without judgment or 
inhibition. The paired control recording requested participants’ attention and 
consisted of neutral, natural geographic information. Consistent with Lueke and 
Gibson, once the mindfulness recording finished participants responded to a state 
mindfulness item taken from the MAAS, (“At this moment [right now] I feel like I 
will rush through activities without being really attentive to them” [reverse scored]) 
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on a 9-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). 
The meaning threat and control audio recordings were identical conversions of the 
short stories used by Proulx and Heine (2009). Franz Kafka’s “The Country Dentist” 
violates normal syntax meaning and logical progression, eliciting implicit, aversive 
arousal due to violations of meaning expectancy (Proulx & Heine, 2009). The paired 
control condition utilised a neutral recording of similar themes and readability as the 
original meaning threat condition, but without meaning expectancy violations. 
 
Measurement of Implicit Racial Bias 
An Indigenous Race IAT was constructed using White faces from Nosek and 
colleagues (2007) research, accessed from the Inquisit database. Indigenous faces 
matched for age and emotive details were accessed from a publicly available 
photography site (Radler, 2011). The photographer was contacted to request use of 
his images and to obtain consent of the imaged individuals. Heightened sensitivity 
surrounding images of deceased individuals and the impacts on Indigenous persons 
were recognised and an Indigenous advisor reviewed all images before construction. 
Creation of a new Indigenous Race IAT was required due to a lack of appropriate 
current resources. Project Implicit’s (Nosek et al., 2007) publicly available IAT uses 
photographs of White people but administers Indigenous stimuli that are drawings 
rather than photographs. Therefore, in order to administer a valid test of implicit 
racial bias, the current study administered a newly constructed Indigenous Race IAT 
(see Appendix D for images). Following methods employed by Lueke and Gibson 
(2015), trials were run in the traditional 7-block format (Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). Participants were instructed to pair randomised combinations of 
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eight positive/pleasant and eight negative/unpleasant attributes with greyscale 
photographs of six Indigenous and six White faces (3 men and 3 women for each 
‘race’). Participants used “E” and “I” keys on a standard QWERTY keyboard to 
classify combinations as directed by the experimenter. Target-attribute pairing blocks 
are counterbalanced between subjects to ensure order effects are not present (Baron 
& Banaji, 2006). The IAT measures implicit racism by assessing the speed and 
accuracy of categorising these words and faces (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). 
Racist attitudes are informed by the relative strength of automatic association for 
either the compatible or incompatible categorisation (Blanton et al., 2006), with a 
score of zero indicating no bias. A high positive score indicates stronger Indigenous 
racial bias, with faster association of White with good and Indigenous with bad. 
Alternatively, high negative scores are indicative of faster association of Indigenous 
with good and White with bad (Ziegert & Hanges, 2005).  
 
Results 
Data was analysed using SPSS version 23.0. Alpha levels were set at p < .05 
for statistical significance. The dependent variable was measured on a continuous 
scale with scores ranging from positive 2 to negative 2. Several factorial analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) tests were conducted to assess for statistically significant 
differences between conditions. A planned contrast was also utilised (Appendix E). 
Covariate analyses for baseline anxiety and mindfulness were not run as no 
differences were detected between groups and neither variable correlated 
significantly with IAT D scores.  
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Data Screening 
Data screening established the dataset met assumptions for normal distribution 
and homogeneity of variance. Due to adequate variance within groups and data 
distribution, with all values of skewness and kurtosis well below the cut off value of 
positive and negative one, transformations were not completed. Identification of two 
outliers occurred, however, removal made no substantial influence on overall 
analyses, so all data points were retained. 
 
Baseline Measures 
In order to rule out any pre-existing differences between groups age and baseline 
levels of mindfulness and anxiety, all participants completed the MAAS and STAI 
before experimental manipulation commenced. There were no significant differences 
between groups for any factors, with all F values < 1.54, all p values > .209, and all 
ηp2 values < 0.04. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for age and 
mindfulness and anxiety baseline measures for each condition. 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations and Confidence Intervals for Age, MAAS and STAI 
Baseline Measures per Condition 
Measure Condition M SD 95% CI 
Age Double active 30.38 13.96 [24.75, 36.02] 
 Mindfulness active 29.00 12.86 [23.69, 34.31] 
 Meaning threat active 28.30 11.35 [24.06, 32.54] 
 Double control 29.13 12.46 [24.56, 32.54] 
MAAS Double active 3.62 0.61 [3.38, 3.87] 
 Mindfulness active 3.66 0.55 [3.44, 3.89] 
 Meaning threat active 3.76 0.66 [3.52, 4.01] 
 Double control 3.94 0.62 [3.71, 4.17] 
STAI Double active 47.04 5.60 [44.78, 49.30] 
 Mindfulness active 48.72 4.06 [47.05, 50.40] 
 Meaning threat active 48.13 3.82 [46.71, 49.56] 
 Double control 46.90 4.80 [45.15, 48.66] 
Note. CI = confidence interval. 
 
 
Manipulation Check 
To assess whether the mindfulness recording successfully induced a state of 
enhanced attention, group differences on the state mindfulness question were 
analysed. The induction was successful, with participants in control conditions 
reporting significantly lower state mindfulness indices than those in the active 
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conditions, F (3, 108) = 7.25, p <.001, ηp2 = 0.17. Violations to Levene’s 
homogeneity of variance (4.94, p = .003), justified a Games-Howell post hoc 
procedure. This revealed no significant differences between mindfulness active and 
double active conditions, p = .708, 95% CIdiff [-0.69, 1.61], and no difference 
between meaning threat active and double control conditions, p = 1.000, 95% CIdiff [-
1.52, 1.51]. However, mindfulness active conditions were significantly different 
from control conditions (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). 
 
 
Table 2  
Means, Standard Deviations and Confidence Intervals for State Mindfulness Scores 
per Condition 
Condition M SD 95% CI 
Double active 3.42 1.68 [2.75, 4.10] 
Mindfulness 2.96 1.40 [2.38, 3.54] 
Meaning threat 4.90 2.09 [4.12, 5.68] 
Double control 4.90 2.39 [4.03, 5.78] 
Note. CI = confidence interval 
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To establish the successful induction of meaning threat, racial bias scores for 
groups that were threatened were compared to those that were not. A planned 
contrast analysis was conducted between meaning threat active and meaning threat 
control conditions. Results revealed a non-significant difference of D scores between 
participants who received active (n = 30, M = 0.51, SD = 0.44, 95% CI [0.34, 0.67]) 
and control (n = 31, M = 0.52, SD = 0.37, 95% CI [0.38, 0.65]) meaning threat 
conditions, t (108) = 0.8, p = .940, η2 = 0.00. Comparisons were conducted on Race 
IAT D scores, as an explicit manipulation check would be invalid.  
 
Race IAT D Scores 
D6 analysis was conducted as per Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji’s (2003) 
amended formula. Raw D scores revealed slightly weaker Indigenous/bad 
associations for participants in the double active (0.40) and mindfulness active (0.38) 
conditions, compared to participants in the meaning threat active (0.51) and double 
control (0.52) conditions. A 2 (mindfulness: control, active) x 2 (meaning threat: 
control, active) factorial ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interaction, 
with all F values < 2.08, all p values > .153, and all ηp2 values < 0.02. Table 3 
displays the means and standard deviations of D scores across conditions for the 
interaction and main effects.  
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Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviations and Confidence Intervals for Race IAT D Scores per 
Main Effects and Interaction   
Effect Condition n M SD 95% CI 
Mindfulness main effect Active 51 0.39 0.49 [0.25, 0.53] 
Control 61 0.51 0.41 [0.41, 0.62] 
Meaning threat main effect Active 56 0.46 0.47 [0.33, 0.59] 
Control 56 0.46 0.43 [0.34, 0.57] 
Mindfulness* meaning 
threat interaction 
Double control 31 0.52 0.37 [0.34, 0.67] 
Meaning threat active 30 0.51 0.44 [1.07, 1.40] 
Mindfulness active 25 0.38 0.48 [0.18, 0.58] 
Double active 26 0.40 0.50 [0.20, 0.60] 
Note. CI = confidence interval 
 
 
Race IAT Accuracy Rates 
In order to rule out potential confounds, accuracy rates were assessed across 
conditions. A 2 (mindfulness: active, control) x 2 (meaning threat: active, control) 
factorial revealed no significant main effects or interaction, with all F values < 2.10, 
all p values > .659, and all ηp2 values < 0.02. Table 4 displays average accuracy 
percentages for each condition across the mindfulness*meaning threat interaction. 
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Table 4 
Mean IAT Accuracy Percentages for Mindfulness*Meaning Threat Interaction 
Note. CI = confidence interval 
 
 
Race IAT Testing Conditions 
Participants either completed the study in the presence of the experimenter or 
online. To establish testing conditions did not confound Race IAT scores a 2 
(observation: yes, no) x 4 (condition: double active, mindfulness active, meaning 
threat active, double control) factorial ANOVA was conducted on D scores. Findings 
revealed no significant main effects or interaction, with all F values < 0.96, all p 
values > .384, and all ηp2 values < 0.03. D scores were equal across observation and 
manipulation conditions. Due to the small end numbers, ability to detect even a small 
effect size is compromised. However, these results suggest no effect of supervisor or 
test condition on racial IAT performance. 
 
Race IAT Discrimination Bias 
In order to establish that discrimination bias occurred in this population, a 
comparison of Race IAT studies was conducted. Due to the lack of Indigenous 
Measure Condition M SD 95% CI 
Mindfulness*meaning 
threat interaction 
Double control 93.71 5.68 [91.63, 95.79] 
Meaning threat active 93.17 4.26 [91.58, 94.76] 
Mindfulness active 92.70 6.75 [89.92, 95.48] 
Double active 95.06 4.16 [93.39, 96.74] 
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Australian IAT research, comparison was conducted on a study investigating implicit 
racial bias towards African Americans faces. Three mean D scores were obtained 
from Smith-McLallen, Johnson, Dovidio, and Pearson (2006). These groups received 
no manipulation and are comparable to the double placebo condition in the current 
study. Smith-McLallen and colleagues (2006) reported mean D scores of 0.45 (n = 
67, SD = 0.36), 0.41 (n = 47, SD = 0.36), and 0.46 (n = 77, SD = 0.37). These values 
are equivalent to the 0.52 (n = 31, SD = 0.37) revealed in the condition that received 
no manipulation.  
 
Discussion 
The current research aimed to establish the resilience of mindfulness after 
uncertainty exposure. Three hypotheses intended to examine this relationship. 
Firstly, it was hypothesised that compared to all other conditions, the mindfulness 
active and meaning threat control condition would elicit the lowest Race IAT scores. 
Secondly, participants in the meaning threat active and mindfulness control condition 
would produce the highest Race IAT scores. Lastly, participants who received both 
an active mindfulness and meaning threat manipulation would produce lower Race 
IAT scores than those in mindfulness control conditions. Although findings revealed 
the hypothesised trend of elevated associations of Indigenous/bad and White/good 
for mindfulness control conditions, variation was not significant and effect sizes 
were negligible.  
Therefore, support for a brief mindfulness exercise protecting participants from 
elevated implicit racial bias following a subsequent meaning threat was not found. 
Participants who received both active mindfulness and meaning threat manipulations 
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produced similar Race IAT scores to those in the mindfulness active, meaning threat 
active, and double control conditions. However, findings revealed support for the 
secondary aim, to establish a valid Race IAT for use in Australian populations. 
Participants in the double control condition produced a mean Race IAT score of 0.52, 
which is comparable to previous grayscale, Race IAT research (Smith-McLallen et 
al., 2006). This comparison demonstrates the generation of a normative 
discrimination bias in the current study, and indicates the Indigenous Race IAT 
successfully elicited a discrimination bias. These comparisons further support the 
finding that any mindfulness induction effect had dissipated after the meaning threat 
manipulation, with parallel mean IAT scores across each condition. No differences of 
IAT accuracy across conditions were revealed with comparable category 
identification precision in the double control and double active conditions. This 
similarity implies that regardless of manipulation, participants accurately categorised 
the images of the IAT. These findings provide additional validity to the newly 
constructed Indigenous Australian Race IAT.  
The current study followed similar methodological features to Lueke and 
Gibson (2015) and hypothesised that congruent with their findings, the mindfulness 
active conditions would display lower implicit racial bias, as measured by an IAT. 
The present findings did not support this, with no significant difference between 
active and control mindfulness groups. The addition of a further 10-minute recording 
in the current study conceivably explains this null replication. As administered by 
Lueke and Gibson, a single state mindfulness question, modified from the MAAS 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003), assessed successful mindfulness induction. Analysis of state 
mindfulness revealed similar findings to Lueke and Gibson, with significantly higher 
state mindfulness reports from mindfulness active participants, compared to 
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mindfulness control participants. This implies an effective generation of mindful 
attention, equivalent to that produced in previous research. However, in the current 
study higher state mindfulness did not transfer onto reduced implicit racial bias as 
measured by the Race IAT. Therefore, although the present findings did not reveal a 
reduction in racial bias as expected, this is potentially a reflection of the further 10-
minutes of attention to a non-mindful stimulus. The literature does not comment on 
how long mindful effects might last although systematic assessment of expected 
persistency is important to identify the resilience elements of such exercises (Lueke 
& Gibson, 2015). The conclusion that the mindfulness effect dissipated due to the 
further recording is not consistent with previous research.  
A single, brief mindfulness session can improve immediate capacity to allocate 
attention and consequently, enhance self-regulation and reduce biased responding. 
Hafenbrack and colleagues (2013) who employed a 15-minute mindfulness exercise 
that reduced participants’ attention to factors outside of their control and reduced 
biased decision-making illustrate this. Similarly, Lueke and Gibson (2015) 
demonstrated the immediacy of mindfulness effects on reducing activation of 
implicit racial bias after a 10-minute mindfulness recording. Understanding the 
current finding of dissipation of this immediate effect is enhanced by comparison to 
existing research, suggesting self-regulation capabilities are superior for individuals 
with greater mindful experience.  
Jha and colleagues (2007) compared attentional subsystem improvements for 
experienced and novice meditators and found that both groups improved, yet 
different attentional elements were enhanced depending on existing mindfulness 
practice. The authors speculate that learning to disengage distracted thoughts, 
initially developed in early practice, enables a heightened capacity to orient, direct 
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and limit attention to various stimuli. Receptive attentional states enable numerous 
environmental cues to enter experience without distraction or exhaustion of cognitive 
resources. In the current study, novice meditators were required to employ mindful 
skills identified by Jha and colleagues to develop only through experienced 
meditation. Exposure to the meaning threat required participants to remove the focal 
breath while maintaining mindful state and paying attention to new, incoming 
information. Experienced meditators do not need to explicitly pay attention to sustain 
focus, whereas novice meditators must develop skills to accept stimuli while 
simultaneously maintaining focus and attention. This clarifies why in the current 
sample only acute mindfulness effects were activated. The transient mindful state 
induced in novice meditators reflects a concentrative attentional state that is 
interrupted by attentional shifts from the focal point. It is understandable that the 
capacity to maintain the mindful state faltered after 10-minutes of non-mindful 
attention for inexperienced participants.  
This was the first known study to use meaning threats and Race IAT’s to assess 
manipulation of implicit racial associations. Therefore, the current study investigated 
a novel manipulation of meaning threat on Race IAT. It also provided novel 
examination of a meaning threat through means of an audio recording. McGregor 
and colleagues (2001) identified that mortality salience (meaning threat) 
strengthened both in-group preference beliefs and discrimination toward minorities. 
Although the current research hypothesised that meaning threat active groups would 
elicit a cognitively anxious state, consequently elevating stereotypical associations, 
findings were not supportive. There are several possible explanations for this. Firstly, 
Sherman and colleagues (2008) emphasise the role of context in the mechanisms of 
self-regulation. To activate the four processes of controlled attention, individuals 
38 
 
 
must pay regulated attention to substantial elements of information (Conrey et al., 
2005). Mindless attention requires disregard and reactivity to stimuli, characterised 
by unfocused attention (Semple, 2010). Due to the auditory nature of the meaning 
threat task and context of psychological research, induced mindlessness was 
potentially not achievable. Previous research employing this stimulus has presented it 
in text, rather than an audio recording. Receiving auditory information with the 
expectation that it will need to be remembered may have resulted in focusing 
attention on numerous parts of information that does not occur when visually 
analysing the stimulus. Due to elevated cognitive resources demanded to hear, 
process, and remember the information, a self-regulation process may have 
unintentionally been activated (Sherman et al., 2008). In order for fluid 
compensatory affirmations to occur, uncertainty arousal must be triggered (Randles 
et al., 2010). Potentially, the current study did not induce mindless attention, which 
resulted in analogous bias scores across conditions. As this is the first study to assess 
the meaning threat in this form, it is beyond the current research capability to 
confirm this.  
 
Implications 
Allocated attention to a 10-minute recording of a bizarre story dissipated any 
effect of higher state mindful indicators induced from a 10-minute mindfulness 
session. Despite the non-activation of expectancy-deviation monitoring processes 
(Oliveira et al., 2007), any effects of mindful attention on reducing stereotypical 
associations were lost. These findings advance current understandings of 
mindfulness training and its utility in applied settings. As identified by Lueke and 
Gibson (2015) the resilience of mindfulness training is important to understand its 
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capacity to enable de-automatisation in everyday interactions. Although Lueke and 
Gibson demonstrated the power of brief mindfulness in reducing automatic 
activation of racial stereotypes, the current study failed to replicate this in a scenario 
that required the mindful effect to be maintained for a further 10 minutes. If the 
effect of mindfulness exercises requires immediate delivery, the practical 
implications are restricted.    
This suggests that once off mindfulness sessions are of practical importance in 
circumstances where instantaneous stereotypical activations are likely to inform 
decisions. Lueke and Gibson (2016) found 10-minutes of mindfulness practice 
resulted in lower racial discrimination in a money and trust related simulation. In 
non-experimental settings, for example, financial decisions such as loan approvals 
and rental properties, brief mindfulness exercises could be productive in reducing 
frequent stereotypical biases surrounding race and age (Lueke & Gibson, 2015). 
However, findings also imply the necessity for continuous engagement in 
mindfulness exercises preceding interracial contact. Before each interaction involved 
in these situations, a mindfulness exercise could lower discriminatory action. 
Therefore, for settings involving intervals between mindful attention induction and 
decision-making processes, continued stereotypical activation and discrimination 
bias are likely. This fits with the mindfulness literature and proposed mechanisms of 
attentional change (Kang et al., 2013). However, the current research indicates that 
resilience of mindfulness practice for novice meditators will not transfer onto 
improved interracial assessments in everyday settings.     
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Limitations 
Despite the theoretical and pragmatic relevance of the reported findings, 
several limitations to the current study need addressing. Two separate issues exist in 
relation to the meaning threat stimulus. Firstly, collection of a manipulation check 
for meaning threat did not occur. The threat involved listening to a recording of a 
short story, anticipated to induce uncertainty-threat and elevated automaticity. The 
rationale for this decision was informed by research indicating fluid compensatory 
affirmations occur largely without conscious awareness (Randles et al., 2010). As 
these meaning threat reactions are a secondary cognitive process that humans are 
generally unaware of, it is difficult to establish a subjective measure that would 
identify high and low levels specifically induced by the stimulus. A short anxiety or 
certainty questionnaire may have proved informative through direct assessment of 
the manipulated variable. However, previous research using these forms of 
manipulation do not establish such measures (Proulx & Heine, 2009), and empirical 
and theoretical underpinnings implied comparisons of Race IAT performance would 
adequately assess meaning threat induction (Kay et al., 2009).  
The secondary limitation refers to whether the meaning threat stimulus 
successfully induced threat arousal. The current study altered Proulx and Heine’s 
(2009) short story into an auditory stimulus. The current findings cannot confidently 
establish whether the null difference across active and control meaning threat 
conditions is due to the audio form of the induction, meaning threats not effecting 
IAT performance, a combination of the audio and online administration, or a 
combination of all of these factors. Confirmation could be achieved through a 
methodological clarification study. This could be accomplished by administering the 
meaning threat stimulus between subjects for a single session and assessing any 
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differences between experimental and online conditions, and a compensatory task 
already demonstrated to work (for example, an artificial-grammar learning task; 
Proulx & Heine, 2009). Findings would further elucidate the current research 
conclusions and inform future research utilising meaning threats.     
The present study followed similar processes to Lueke and Gibson’s (2015) 
research, however as the focus of the current research was to establish the resilience 
of mindfulness effects rather than its cognitive nature, quad analysis was not 
conducted. Partial replication may have been achievable by identifying reductions in 
automatic activation of racial bias following mindfulness, but this would not 
substantially aid interpretation of the current findings. Collection of participants’ data 
occurred in both observed and unobserved settings in the current study. As Lueke 
and Gibson induced mindfulness in a controlled setting, and the present study was 
available online, participants’ environments may have influenced results. To the 
extent it was possible, analysis revealed no significant variance between supervised 
and online participants’ performance. This informs understandings about testing 
online and indicates that in the current research, supervision was not influential. 
However, the small end numbers reduced power to detect subtle effects. 
Nevertheless, if mindful effects are only influential in research conditions then they 
lack ecological validity and are pragmatically limited. 
The fifth and final limitation refers to the construction of a valid Indigenous 
Australian IAT. The Race IAT did not measure accuracy for target face identification 
alone. This meant that confident assessment of the new Indigenous images eliciting 
precise identification rates was not possible. A direct measure of accuracy of 
identification for the new Indigenous faces would provide further confirmation of the 
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IAT’s validity as an Indigenous Australian bias measure. Within the restrictions of 
time and capacity, the current study indicates the validity of the measure.  
 
Future Research  
The current research has suggested that in novice meditators, any potential 
effect of a brief mindfulness exercise dissipates after 10-minutes attention to a non-
mindful stimulus. This initial examination of mindfulness’ resilience promotes the 
requirement for further research. The next stage for this line of research requires 
comparing results to an experienced sample of meditators. Hafenbrack and 
colleagues (2013) note that future research should investigate the potential of 
experienced meditators and effect of mindfulness on biased decision-making. Teper 
and Inzlicht (2013) established significant structural and functional neural change in 
long-term meditators. This suggests that enduring mindfulness states initiate 
neuroplastic developments in attentional and cognitive brain regions (Slagter et al., 
2011). A quasi-experimental design would allow the investigation of whether a 
strong mindfulness background allows for applied attention across tasks, without 
dissipated effects of mindful attention on automatic associations. Selecting a sample 
of either experienced meditators, or novice meditators to train across a period of 
time, and assessing implicit racial bias after the mindfulness and meaning threat 
manipulations would further explain the current findings and inform the mindfulness 
literature on short- and long-term retention effects. Although technically this study is 
possible, it is logistically out of reach of available resources. 
As discussed in limitations, further validity of the Indigenous IAT should be a 
priority for future research as implicit bias scores are reflective of those found in 
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American samples using African American Race IAT’s (Smith-McLallen et al., 
2006). Effective investigation of implicit racial bias in Australian populations 
requires association measurement tools that reflect legitimate environmental cues. 
Therefore, employing this Race IAT in different cities around Australia will help to 
demonstrate its effectiveness.  
Future research should also establish whether shorter meaning threat inductions 
are more informative of mindfulness’ protective measures. The current stimulus was 
employed due to its unconscious influence (Proulx & Heine, 2009), yet numerous 
examples of meaning threats are available. Any information that causes an individual 
to question meaning frameworks can elicit the meaning threat response (Proulx et al., 
2012). For example, quickly administered meaning threats can be a reminder of 
humans’ mortality (Randles et al., 2010). As Race IAT’s target attitudes that humans 
are often unaware of (Sturge-Apple et al., 2015), transparency of targeted attitudes is 
important to ensure explicit beliefs do not influence responses (Hahn et al., 2014). 
Using meaning threats that are obviously inducing some sort of threat in the 
individual does not implicate the transparency of IAT’s, but may allow mindfulness 
effects to continue into the performance task. This is important, as it would provide 
practical implications for brief mindfulness practice. For example, comparing two 
and five minute meaning threats to explore the resilience of mindfulness in novice 
samples would suggest whether brief mindfulness is resilient against a transitory 
anxious state. If biases continued, it would suggest that mindfulness has little 
protective measure against momentary uncertainty and is unlikely to be 
pragmatically useful.       
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Conclusion 
The current study did not reveal reduced implicit racial bias after a mindfulness 
exercise. State mindfulness scores implied a successful induction of mindfulness, but 
the hypothesised reductions in implicit racial bias scores were not revealed. The 
findings did not support the hypothesised effect of mindfulness protecting against 
induced uncertainty elicited by a meaning threat. Although, this null finding may be 
reflective of the meaning threat stimulus not inducing cognitive threat successfully. 
Regardless, stereotypical associations of Indigenous with bad and White with good 
were analogous across the four conditions. Identification of a strong racial bias 
occurred through the construction of an Indigenous Australian Race IAT used to 
assess automatic associations. Implications of the findings are; any effects of 
increased mindful attention dissipate after 10-minutes of attention to another 
stimulus in a sample of novice meditators. This suggests that in situations when 
known interracial contact is about to occur, a brief mindfulness exercise may reduce 
immediate stereotypical activation. However, this effect will not transfer onto 
behaviours or thought processes after the mindful attention is allocated somewhere 
else. The study proposes an Indigenous Australian Race IAT tool to measure implicit 
racial bias in Australian populations. This measurement elicits automatic associations 
of Indigenous with bad and identified high rates of stereotypical bias in an Australian 
population. Establishment of this tool is important as it equips researchers with a 
contextual appropriate measurement of racial bias in Australia. 
Future research should conduct a similar study instead recruiting experienced 
meditators and comparing them to beginners. It is theoretically plausible that 
dissipated effects will be smaller for individuals with ongoing mindful attention and 
awareness. Further research into meaning threats and IAT’s should employ and 
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experiment with varying meaning threat stimuli to allow precise investigation of 
mindfulness resilience against cognitive threat. Clarification of the meaning threat 
stimulus in the current study would provide stronger understanding of the results and 
implications for pragmatic application. Examining whether the failure to induce 
enhanced automatic association was specifically due to the meaning threats’ auditory 
form or online induction would be informative. Follow-up investigations of validity 
for the newly constructed and administered Indigenous Race IAT will improve 
implicit racial bias identification for Australian samples.   
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Appendix C – Manipulation Transcripts 
 
Mindfulness Condition 
Please follow the instructions on this recording, the idea is for you to relax and 
have a little time for yourself. 
The aim of this recording is to increase awareness of your body and mind, of your 
whole self. It is very important to be kind with yourself, be gentle with yourself, and 
allow yourself to relax. You do not need to make an effort to relax, simply becoming 
more aware of your self will encourage relaxation. During this time there is no right 
way to feel. Whatever you feel is fine, because it is the true you.  
It is important to pay attention to your body and mind, to recognise your thoughts 
and feelings and to accept them exactly as they are. See what your body tries to tell 
you and live with it during these moments. Simply observe yourself and notice the 
signs that your body and mind give you. Live in the present with your true self with 
any good feelings as well as with your worries and any feelings of discomfort. 
Now it is the time to be with you, keep always in mind there is no right or wrong 
way to feel, everything is acceptable because they are your true feelings. Even if you 
are not feeling anything at all this is alright as well. Just accept your sensations 
simply because they belong to you and it is the way you feel, give yourself 
permission to feel and let that be just fine.  
Sit on the chair provided as comfortably as you can, you may have your legs 
stretched out in front of you or bend them one next to the other but keep them 
uncrossed. You may sit up straight on the chair or sit lower in the chair, choose the 
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body posture that makes you feel most comfortable. Allow your eyes to close gently 
if this is feels comfortable, but it is important to stay awake.  
Listening to the instructions, just watch your body and the way your mind works. 
Notice your feelings and any other experience you might have. Notice that you are 
breathing, breath deep and fully and notice your breath flowing in and out of your 
body. Without trying to control it in any way, focus your attention on your breath for 
some moments, you’re breathing.  
Feel the breath that enters your body by your nostrils or by your mouth if you 
have it open, then become aware of your breath coming out of your body. You may 
feel different sensations in your whole body. With every in-breath, notice the 
sensations in your nostrils, in your mouth, in your lungs, in your chest or in your 
abdomen. You may also observe sensations with every out-breath as the air leaves 
your body. Observe your chest rising with the in-breath and falling with the out-
breath. Become aware of the air that fills in your chest every time you breathe in and 
then of the sensation of emptiness that follows as the air flows out of your chest.  
Now feel the breath in your abdominal area. You may want to place your hands 
on your abdomen. Notice that very gentle rising and falling of the breath as it enters 
and leaves your body. No need to control this in any way, almost letting the breath 
breathe itself. Notice how your tummy gently rises with each in-breath and then falls 
with each out-breath. Watch the air entering your abdomen and then leaving your 
abdomen with your hands rising and falling in the rhythm of your breath. Allow your 
breath to flow naturally in and out of your body without any control. Just let your 
breath breathe itself, no need to do anything. Simply observing it; watching the 
breath moving in and moving out. Just let yourself breathe kindly and be aware of 
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the air that keeps entering your body and leaving it in a smooth and gentle way. 
Observe that every in-breath is very naturally followed by an out-breath and that 
every out-breath is very naturally followed by an in-breath. With no control, just let 
your breath do its natural cycle of in-breaths and out-breaths. Let your breath breathe 
on its own, be aware of this movement of breath in and out of your body and feel it.  
Keep in mind that if you become distressed or uncomfortable with your feelings, 
thoughts or body sensations at any point during this recording it is always possible to 
return to this sensation of the breath moving into the body, of the breath leaving the 
body. Letting the breath breathe itself, not having to control it. Your breathing can 
become a safe place where you can return if at any time you feel uncomfortable. 
Return to your in-breath that is always followed by an out-breath and your out-breath 
that is always followed by an in-breath.  
And, if you would like at this point, you may remove your hands from your 
abdomen, if you have placed them there, and put them alongside your body. Move 
your awareness away from your breathing and your chest and move it down to your 
abdomen, to your belly and to your stomach. Explore your abdominal area with your 
awareness, if you do not feel any sensation this is fine. Be aware of any tightness or 
looseness in your stomach, feel the muscles in your abdomen contracting or 
remaining still. You may even feel pain, just let the painful feelings be there and do 
nothing to change them. Explore all the sensations in your abdominal area, you may 
observe the feeling of the clothing on your tummy, you may even feel their warmth 
or coldness on your skin. You may realise you have no sensations in the area of your 
abdomen and your stomach, this is alright. 
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And then notice your breath, as it enters your body and goes down to your 
abdomen. You observe the rising of your belly as you breathe in and then its falling 
as you breathe out. Imagine that your abdominal area is a safe place where you can 
feel all the air entering your whole body and transferring this air to every part of your 
body. Your whole body breathes just from your abdominal area. With every in-
breath imagine the air entering your stomach and from there travelling all the way 
down to your hips, to your thighs, and toes and from there the air travels upward 
towards your chest, your throat, your face and head. Then imagine the breath being 
in your stomach again and from your belly button, leaving your body, until the next 
breath comes in. Notice that this journey of the breath is done on its own, with you 
only having to observe it. Allow yourself to feel this journey of the breath for a few 
moments. 
Do not try to control the breath, let it flow freely in and out of your body, 
encouraging a deeper state of relaxation. As you watch your breath, feel a gentle 
stillness and calmness, observe any thoughts or feelings without trying to control 
them, just let them be. 
Now slowly open your eyes if they are closed and remain still. You may observe 
your surroundings, the room you are in right now. See the shape of the room and its 
colours and textures. As this recording comes to an end here, you may start moving 
your body gently. You may want to stretch your legs and arms, or stretch your neck. 
Let any calmness that you are feeling now stay with you for a little longer. 
Remember that if you feel uncomfortable at any time you can always return to this 
sensation of the breath moving into the body, the breath leaving the body. Letting the 
breath breathe itself, not having to control it.  
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Mindfulness Control Condition 
The parish of Selborne lies in the extreme eastern corner of the county of 
Hampshire bordering on the county of Sussex and not far from the county of Surrey. 
It’s about 50 miles south-west of London in latitude 51 and near midway between the 
towns of Alton and Petersfield. Being very large and extensive it abuts on twelve 
parishes, two of which are in Sussex: Trotton and Rogate. If you begin from the 
South and proceed westward, the adjacent parishes are Empshot, Newton Valence, 
Farringdon, Hartley Mauditt, Great Worldham, Kingsley, Headley, Bramshott, 
Totten, Rogate, Liss and Greatham. The soils of this district are almost as various 
and diversified as the views and aspects. The high part to the south west consists of a 
vast hill of chalk rising 300 feet above the village and is divided into a sheep-down, 
the high wood and a long hanging wood called the Hanger.  
The covert of this eminence is altogether beech, the most lovely of all forest trees, 
whether we consider its smooth rind or bark, its glossy foliage, or graceful pendulous 
boughs. The down, or sheep-walk, is a pleasing park-like spot, of about one mile by 
half that space, jutting out on the verge of the hill country, where it begins to break 
down into the plains, and commanding a very engaging view, being an assemblage of 
hill, dale, woodlands, heath, and water. The prospect is bounded to the south-east and 
east by the vast range of mountains called the Susses-downs by Guild-down near 
Guildford, and by the Downs round Dorking, and Ryegate in Surrey, to the north-
east, which altogether, with the country beyond Alton and Farnham, form a noble 
and extensive outline. 
At the foot of this hill, one stage or step from the uplands, lies the village, which 
consists of one single straggling street, three-quarters of a mile in length, in a 
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sheltered vale, and running parallel with the Hanger. The houses are divided from the 
hill by a vein of stiff clay (good wheat-land), yet stand on a rock of white stone, little 
in appearance removed from chalk; but seems so far from being calcareous, that it 
endures extreme heat. Yet that the freestone still preserves somewhat, that is 
analogous to chalk, is plain from the beeches which descend as low as those rocks 
extend, and no farther, and thrive on them as well, where the ground is steep, as on 
the chalks. 
At each end of the village, which runs from south east to north west, arises a small 
rivulet: that at the north west end frequently fails; but the other is a fine perennial 
spring, little influenced by drought or wet seasons called Well-head. This breaks out 
of some high grounds joining to Noar Hill, a noble chalk promontory, remarkable for 
sending forth two streams into two different seas. The one to the south becomes a 
branch of the Arun, running to Arundel, and so falling into the British Channel: The 
other to the north. The Selborne stream makes one branch of the Wey; and meeting 
the Blackdown stream at Hedleigh, and the Alton and Farnham stream at Tilford-
bridge, swells into a considerable river, navigable at Godalming; from whence it 
passes to Guildford, and so into the Thames at Weybridge; and thus at the nore into 
the German Ocean. 
Our wells, at an average, run to about sixty-three feet, and when sunk to that depth 
seldom fail; but produce a fine limpid water, soft to the taste, and much commended 
by those who drink the pure element, but which does not lather well with soap. 
As the parish still inclines down towards Wolmer-forest, at the juncture of the 
clays and sand the soil becomes a wet, sandy loam, remarkable for timber, and 
infamous for roads. The oaks of Temple and Blackmoor stand high in the estimation 
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of purveyors and have furnished much naval timber. While the trees on the freestone 
grow large, but are what workmen call shaky, and so brittle as often to fall to pieces 
in sawing. Beyond the sandy loam the soil becomes a hungry lean sand, till it 
mingles with the forest; and will produce little without the assistance of lime and 
turnips. 
In the centre of the village, and near the church, is a square piece of ground 
surrounded by houses and vulgarly called the Plestor. In the midst of this spot stood, 
in old times, a vast oak, with a short squat body, and huge horizontal arms extending 
almost to the extremity of the area. This venerable tree, surrounded with stone steps 
and seats above them, was the delight of old and young, and a place of much resort in 
summer evenings; where the former sat in grave debate, while the latter frolicked and 
danced before them.  
Long might it have stood, had not the amazing tempest in 1703 overturned it at 
once, to the infinite regret of the inhabitants, and the vicar, who bestowed several 
pounds in setting it in its place again, but all his care could not avail; the tree 
sprouted for a time, then withered and died.  
Among the singularities of this place the two rocky hollow lanes, the one to Alton, 
and the other to the forest, deserve our attention. These roads, running through the 
malm lands, are, by the traffic of ages, and the fretting of water, worn down through 
the first stratum of our freestone, and partly through the second; so that they look 
more like water-courses than roads, and are bedded with naked rag for furlongs 
together. In many places they are reduced sixteen or eighteen feet beneath the level 
of the fields; and after floods, and in frosts, exhibit very grotesque and wild 
appearances, from the tangled roots that are twisted among the strata, and from the 
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torrents rushing down their broken sides; and especially when those cascades are 
frozen into icicles, hanging in all the fanciful shapes of frost-work. 
These rugged gloomy scenes affright the ladies when they peep down into them 
from the paths above, and make timid horsemen shudder while they ride along them; 
but delight the naturalist with their various botany, and particularly with their curious 
ferns with which they abound. 
 
The manor of Selborne, was it strictly looked after, with its kindly aspects, and all its 
sloping coverts, would swarm with game; even now hares, partridges, and pheasants 
abound; and in old days woodcocks were as plentiful. There are few quails, because 
they more affect open fields than enclosures; after harvest some few landrails are 
seen. 
The parish of Selborne, by taking in so much of the forest, is a vast district. Those 
who tread the bounds are employed part of three days in the business, and are of 
opinion that the outline, in all its curves and indentings, does not comprise less than 
thirty miles. 
The village stands in a sheltered spot, secured by the Hanger from the strong 
westerly winds. The air is soft, but rather moist from the effluvia of so many trees; 
yet perfectly healthy and free from agues. The inhabitants enjoy a good share of 
health and longevity: and the parish swarms with children. 
Should I omit to describe with some exactness the forest of Wolmer, of which 
three-fifths perhaps lie in this parish, my account of Selborne would be very 
imperfect, as it is a district abounding with many curious productions, both animal 
and vegetable; and has often afforded me much entertainment both as a sportsman 
and as a naturalist.  
71 
 
 
Meaning Threat Condition 
 I was in great perplexity. I had to start on an urgent journey. A boy with a 
severe toothache was waiting for me in a village ten miles off and thick blizzard of 
snow filled all the wide spaces between him and me. I had a carriage, a light carriage 
with big wheels, exactly right for our country roads. Muffled in furs, my bag of 
instruments in my hand, I was in my courtyard all ready for the journey, but there 
was no horse to be had, no horse.  
 My own horse had wandered away. My servant girl, Rose, was now running 
around the village trying to borrow a horse, but it was hopeless. I knew it, and I stood 
there forlornly, with the snow gathering more and more thickly upon me, more and 
more unable to move.  In my gateway Rose appeared, alone, and waved the lantern. 
Of course, who would lend a horse at this time of night for such a journey?   
I strode through my courtyard once more and I could see no way out. In my 
confused distress I kicked at the dilapidated door of my yearlong uninhabited pigsty.  
It flew open and flapped to and fro on its hinges.  A steam and a smell of horses 
came from it.  A dim stable lantern was swinging inside from a rope.  A man, 
crouching on his behind in that low space, showed an open blue-eyed face.  
 "Shall I yoke up?" he asked, crawling out on all fours.  I did not know what 
to say and merely stooped down to see what else was in the pigsty.  My servant girl 
was standing beside me.  "You never know what you're going to find in your own 
house," she said, and we both laughed.   
“Hey there Brother, hey there Sister!" called the man, and two horses, 
enormous creatures with powerful flanks, one after the other, their legs tucked close 
to their bodies, each well-shaped head lowered like a camel's, by sheer strength of 
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buttocking squeezed out through the low door which they filled entirely.  But at once 
they were standing up, their legs long and their bodies steaming thickly.  "Give him a 
hand," I said, and the willing girl hurried to help the groom with the harnessing.  
Yet hardly was she beside him when the groom clipped hold of her and 
pushed his face against hers.  She sighed and stepped into him; on her cheek was the 
trail of his tongue.  "You brute," I yelled in fury, "do you want a whipping?" but in 
the same moment reflected that the man was a stranger, that I did not know where he 
came from, and that of his own free will he was helping me out when everyone else 
had failed me.  As if he knew my thoughts he took no offence at my threat but still 
busied with the horses, only turning around once toward me.   
 "Get in," he said then, and indeed, everything was ready.  A magnificent pair 
of horses, I observed, such as I had never sat behind, and I climbed in the carriage 
happily.  "But I'll drive, you don't know the way," I said.  "Of course," said he, "I'm 
not coming with you anyway, I'm staying with Rose." "You're coming with me," I 
said to the groom, "or I won't go, urgent as my journey is.  I'm not thinking of paying 
for it by handing my servant girl over to your lusts."   
 "Gee up!" he said, clapped his hands, the horses started, my carriage whirled 
off, I could just hear the sound of their hands on one another and I was deafened and 
blinded by a storming rush that steadily buffeted all my senses.  
 But this only for a moment, since, as if the boy’s farmyard had opened out 
just before my courtyard gate, I was already there, the horses had come quietly to a 
standstill, the blizzard had stopped, moonlight all around, the boy’s parents hurried 
out of the house, his sister behind them, I was almost lifted out of the carriage, from 
their confused speech I gathered not a word, in their house the air was almost 
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unbreathable, a neglected stove was smoking, I wanted to push open a window but 
first I had to look at the boy.  
The youngster heaved himself up from under the feather bedding, threw his 
arms around my neck, and whispered in my ear, "Pull my tooth."  I glanced around 
the room. No one had heard it. The parents were leaning forward in silence waiting 
for my verdict. The sister had set a chair for my handbag. I opened the bag and 
hunted among my instruments. The boy kept clutching at me from his bed to remind 
me of his entreaty. I picked up a pair of pliers, examined them in the candlelight, and 
laid them down again.   
 "Yes," I thought blasphemously, "in cases like this the gods are helpful, send 
the missing horse, add to it a second because of the urgency, and to crown everything 
bestow even a groom—” And only now did I remember Rose again; what was I to 
do, how could I get to her, how could I pull her away from under that groom at ten 
miles' distance, with a team of horses I couldn't control?   
These horses, now, they had somehow slipped their reins, pushed the 
windows open from the outside; I did not know how. Each of them had stuck a head 
in at a window and, quite unmoved by the startled cries of the family, stood eyeing 
the boy.  
The mother stood by the boy’s bed and cajoled me toward it; I yielded, and, 
while one of the horses whinnied loudly to the ceiling, leaned my head to the boy's 
face, which shivered under my wet beard.  I confirmed what I already knew; the boy 
had no teeth.  
Well, this should be the end of my visit, I had once more been called out 
needlessly, I was used to that, the whole district made my life a torment with my 
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night bell, but that I should have to lose Rose this time as well, the pretty girl who 
had lived in my house for years almost without my noticing her—so beautiful- that 
sacrifice was too much to ask, and I somehow had to get it reasoned out in my head 
with the help of what craft I could muster, in order not to let fly at this family, which 
with the best intentions in the world could not restore young Rose to me.   
 But as I shut my bag and put an arm out for my fur coat, the family 
meanwhile standing together, the father sniffing at the glass of sherry in his hand, the 
mother, apparently disappointed in me - why, what did these people expect? - biting 
her lips with tears in her eyes, the sister fluttering a towel, I was somehow ready to 
admit conditionally that the boy might have teeth after all.   
I went toward him, he welcomed me smiling, as if I were bringing him a 
delicious candy- ah, now both horses were whinnying together. The noise, I suppose, 
was ordained by heaven to assist my examination of the boy - and this time I 
discovered that the boy did indeed have teeth.  In his right molar, near the back, was 
an open cavity, dark brown, in many variations of shade, dark in the hollows, lighter 
at the edges, softly granulated, open as a surface mine to the daylight.  That was how 
it looked from a distance.  
But on a closer inspection there was another complication.  I could not help a 
low whistle of surprise.  Worms were wriggling from their fastness in the interior of 
the cavity towards the light, with small white heads and many little legs.  
The family was pleased; they saw me busying myself; the sister told the 
mother, the mother the father, the father told several guests who were coming in, 
through the moonlight at the open door, walking on tiptoe, keeping their balance with 
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outstretched arms and singing, “Will you pull his tooth?" That is what people are like 
in my district.  Always expecting the impossible from the dentist.    
Then my coat was off and I looked at the family quietly, my fingers in my 
beard and my head cocked to one side.  I was altogether composed and equal to the 
situation and remained so, although it was no help to me, since they now took me by 
the head and feet and carried me to the boy’s bed.  They laid me down in it next to 
the boy.  Then they all left the room; the door was shut; the singing stopped; clouds 
covered the moon; the bedding was warm around me; the horses' heads in the open 
windows wavered like shadows.   
 But now it was time for me to think of escaping.  The horses were still 
standing faithfully in their places.  My clothes, my fur coat, my bag were quickly 
collected; I didn't want to waste time dressing; if the horses raced home as they had 
come, I should only be springing, as it were, out of this bed and into my own. 
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Meaning Threat Control 
I was becoming extremely worried. I had to set out to help a young boy who 
had a terrible toothache, but a morning snowstorm had made the roads surrounding 
my home nearly unpassable. To make matters worse, my horse had recently escaped 
from the barn, so while I had a sleigh, it wasn’t going to be of any use.  
 The young boy with the toothache lived in a village several miles away, so 
there was no possibility of my walking there in this weather. I had sent my 
housekeeper, Rose, into town to see if I could borrow someone’s horse, but it didn’t 
seem likely that anyone would lend me their horse in this terrible weather.  
 I paced and paced around the courtyard of my home, waiting for Rose to 
arrive with some news. It had begun snowing again, the wind was picking up, and 
night was falling. I began to feel like the situation was hopeless. In frustration, I 
kicked open the door of my home and cursed to myself. 
I had just finished pulling off my boots when I heard Rose’s voice calling 
from the courtyard. I ran outside and saw her standing at the gate holding a lantern 
and smiling excitedly. Standing behind her was the local postman, John Cheevers, 
who held the reigns of an enormous horse that he used to pull his mail cart. I couldn’t 
believe our good fortune! 
“You aren’t going to get very far in your socks!” called Cheevers, and just 
then I realized that I had forgotten to put my boots back on. We all laughed as Rose 
fetched them for me. Cheevers began to harness the horse to my sleigh and I began to 
bundle up for the trip. Even with a sturdy horse, this was going to be a long journey 
in the growing darkness and I had to make sure that I was prepared for the worst.   
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 As Rose began packing the sleigh with supplies, I could not help but notice 
both her and Cheevers stealing glances at one another in the dim lantern light. I had 
suspected for some time that Rose was smitten with this young postman, and I 
imagined that it was no coincidence that she had gone to him for help in our hour of 
need. 
When all of the supplies were packed and the horse harnessed, I climbed onto 
the sleigh and prepared to set out. Cheevers began to climb onto the sleigh with me, 
but I waved him away. “You’ve done enough, John. Why don’t you take Rose into 
town and have a nice meal. It’s my treat.” I tried to hand Cheevers a few dollars, but 
he politely refused the money. 
 “Alright,” I said, “have it your way. Just make sure that you have her back in 
time to fix me my own dinner when I return.” Cheevers promised that he would, and 
Rose held his hand tightly in hers. “Gee up!” I cried, and the horse lurched forward. 
 By now the night was settling in, and the wind was howling through the trees. 
My lantern was barely able to penetrate the sea of blowing snow, and the road I was 
following was lost under a thick blanket of white. I followed the tree-line as I made 
my way through the woods, though it seemed like I had travelled a long time without 
making a great deal of progress. 
 Though the horse was well-trained to pull heavy loads though winter storms, 
he was clearly labouring to make his way through this blizzard. The snow was nearly 
up to the horse’s knees, and it was falling even more heavily than when I had first 
begun my journey. I considered turning back and returning home, but I was not sure 
if I was closer to my destination or my own warm bed. 
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After what seemed liked hours, I finally spied what appeared to be dim lights 
through the howling, swirling whiteness that surrounded me. Surely, I must have 
arrived at the village! As I drew nearer, I could make out the form of a young woman 
holding a lantern and a small shack behind her that seemed nearly buried in snow. 
“Over here!” she yelled, and waved the lantern over her head to guide me. 
 The horse was by now exhausted, and a thick steam arouse from his body as 
he shuddered to a stop in front of the shack. I slowly pulled myself from the sleigh 
and grabbed hold of my bag of dental tools and medical supplies. “It’s my son,” the 
woman cried, “he has a terrible toothache and he’s been moaning about it for days!” 
 I followed the woman into the shack and was surprised at what I saw. Despite 
the tiny confines of the room, an entire family greeted me with expectant, worried 
faces. There were two small girls, the young woman and her husband, and what 
appeared to be a grandmother and grandfather, all huddled around a small boy lying 
in a small bed by the fireplace. 
 I hastily introduced myself as the dentist they had sent for, and asked if I 
could examine the boy. The family spent several moments staring at me in silence. 
Often, rural people are somewhat awestruck by doctors whom they treat with a kind 
of wonder, understanding that we are here to help, but not having any understanding 
of our knowledge or craft. 
Finally, the mother motioned me silently towards the young boy, who 
appeared to be in terrible pain. His left cheek was swollen, and he let out a low moan 
as I sat on a stool beside his bed. “Can you open your mouth?” I asked, and he shook 
his head ‘no’. Very gently, I helped the boy ease open his clenched jaw, and what I 
saw confirmed what I had feared; his left molar was badly decayed. 
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 “Is there anything you can do to fix the tooth?” the mother asked.  I explained 
to her that the tooth was in too poor a condition and would need to be pulled at once. 
At this news, the family looked surprised and disappointed. I’m not sure what they 
were expecting I would be able to do for the boy, and it is possible that they had 
overestimated a dentist’s abilities. 
 “Pull the tooth?” cried the grandfather. “We could have done that ourselves, 
without wasting time and money on you coming out here!” Given the trouble I had 
gone to in making the trip to help this boy –without the expectation of payment– I 
was more than a little annoyed with the older man’s remarks, and made no effort to 
conceal my annoyance. 
“Please, just do what you can,” said the mother. She put her hand on my 
shoulder and shot the older man an angry look. He sheepishly stepped away and 
reached into an old cloth sack. “I’ve been saving this for an emergency,” he said, and 
pulled out a bottle of brandy. “This should warm you up.” He handed me the bottle 
and I courteously took a swig of the liquor, which did make me feel a little better. 
This also seemed to put the family at ease. 
I reached into my dental bag and went to work. Of course, things would have 
been easier if we had been in my office in town, but I was able to make do. With 
little difficulty I was able to remove the young boy’s rotten tooth, though not without 
great discomfort for the child. Unfortunately, that couldn’t be helped in these 
difficult circumstances, and I knew that he would soon be feeling much better. 
 The older man tried to hand me a few dollars, but I politely refused the sum 
of money which most likely represented their earnings for the week. Instead, I told 
them that they might do me a favour and allow me to spend the night rather than 
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trying to return home in this snowstorm. They readily agreed, and I was soon fast 
asleep, propped up on the stool leaning against the boy’s bed. 
 By morning, the sky had cleared and it was safe for me to return. The family 
provided me with a hot bowl of porridge and a strong cup of coffee, and I was soon 
my way back home. By noon I had arrived back in my courtyard, and after I led the 
horse into the barn, I entered my home and called out to Rose to let her know that I 
had arrived safely.  
In place of a reply, there was a note on the kitchen table which read “Dear Dr. 
Gable, John has asked me to marry him and I have accepted. We have gone into 
town to find Reverend Jones. John feels bad that I will no longer be working for you, 
but he says that you can keep his horse. Rose. PS. Sorry I forgot to leave your dinner 
before I left.” 
I laughed and put the note into my pocket. 
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Indigenous Face IAT Stimuli 
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